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ARGUMENT 
As noted in Appellant's Opening Brief/ there 
currently exist throughout the United States two approaches 
as to the elements necessary to establish legal malpractice 
against an attorney. In order to establish liability under 
the traditional approach, a Plaintiff in a legal malpractice 
action must have had a "meritorious claim" in the underlying 
action; in other words, that "but for" the negligence of the 
Defendant attorney, injury would not have occurred. See, 
for example, Meiselman, Attorney Malpractice: Law and 
Procedure, Sec. 3:1 at 39 (1980). Under the contemporary 
approach, the trend is to shift the burden of proof on the 
issue of "meritorious claim" to the defendant attorney. 
See, for example, Glidden v. Terranova, 427 N.E.2d 1169 
(Mass. 1981) . 
Respondent BARBER has offered no arguments to 
rebut the logic advanced in support of the emerging trend or 
contemporary approach. Rather, BARBER has taken the 
position that under Young v. Bridwell, 437 P.2d 686, 20 Utah 
2d 332 (1968), no instruction is given as to whether the 
reguirement of "meritorious claim" is an element necessary 
in establishing liability or in establishing the amount of 
Plaintiff's damages. (See page 9 of Respondent's Brief.) 
However, the Utah Supreme Court in Young v. Bridwell, supra 
at 689, specifically stated: 
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"The parties are not in disagree-
ment that in order to make out a cause 
of action against the attorney for 
failing to advise of their right to 
appeal, it would have to be shown that 
there was at least a reasonable likeli-
hood of reversing the judgment and that 
it would have benefitted the plaintiff," 
(Emphasis added.) 
Naturally, other Courts following the traditional 
approach uniformly hold that in order to make out a cause of 
action against an attorney for legal malpractice, there must 
be a finding of "meritorious claim." See for example 
Freschi v. Grand Co. Venture, 564 F.Supp. 414, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983) which states: 
"Tn order to make out a claim of 
malpract ice, Freschi must allege the 
existence of an attorney-client rela-
tionship, negligence on the part of the 
attorney or some other conduct in breach 
of that relationship, and that but for 
the alleged acts of malpractice, the 
client would have been able to proceed 
in a manner other than that which 
actually eventuated. (Citations 
omitted.)" (Emphasis added.) 
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L i k e w i s e , see Spannaus v. La rk in , Hoffman, Daly, 
and L i n d g r e n , 368 N.W.2d 3 9 5 , 398 (Minn.App. 1985) which 
s t a t e s : 
" I n o r d e r t o p r e v a i l in a l e g a l 
m a l p r a c t i c e c a s e , a p l a i n t i f f must 
e s t a b l i s h f o u r e l e m e n t s : ( 1 ) t h e 
e x i s t e n c e of an a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t r e l a -
t i o n s h i p ? (2) a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g n e g l i -
gence or breach of c o n t r a c t ; (3) t h a t 
such a c t s were t h e p rox imate cause of 
t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s damages ; (4) t h a t but 
f o r d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n d u c t t h e p l a i n t i f f 
w o u l d h a v e b e e n s u c c e s s f u l i n t h e 
p r o s e c u t i o n o r d e f e n s e of the a c t i o n . 
B lue Water C o r p . , I n c . v . O 'Toole , 336 
N.W.2d 279, 281 (Minn. 1983) . F a i l u r e 
of p r o o f on any one e l e m e n t d e f e a t s 
r e c o v e r y . " (Emphasis added. ) 
In a d d i t i o n , see F i d l e r v . S u l l i v a n , 463 N.Y.S.2d, 
279, 280 (A.D.3 Dept. 1983) which s t a t e s : 
" I n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h a p r ima 
f a c i e c a s e of l e g a l m a l p r a c t i c e , a 
p l a i n t i f f must prove the n e g l i g e n c e of 
t h e a t t o r n e y , t h a t such neg l igence was 
t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of i n j u r y t o t h e 
p l a i n t i f f , and t h a t absen t such n e g l i -
- 3 -
qence, plaintiff would have been 
successful in the underlying action. 
(Citations omitted)." (Emphasis added.) 
See also Newman v. Silver, 553 F. Supp. 485, 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Bartholomew v. Crockett, 475 N.E.2d 1035 
( Ill.App.1st Dist. 1985); Dings v. Callahan, 602 P.2d 542 
(Kan. 1979); and Byrd v. Martin, Hopkins, Lemon and Carter, 
P.C. , 564 F. Supp. 1425 (W.D.Va. 1983). It should also be 
noted that Respondent's citation to 45 A.L.R.2d 62 is 
without merit since that annotation specifically states, at 
pg. 63 thereof, that it does not discuss questions as to 
liability and proximate cause in legal malpractice actions. 
These questions are discussed in the annotation found at 45 
A.L.R.2d 5 and states, in pertinent part: 
"The ordinary rule that negligence 
is actionable only where it is the 
proximate cause of the damages com-
plained of has frequently been applied 
in actions against attorneys for alleged 
negligence in connection with litiga-
tion. In such cases the damages claimed 
are usually the value of the claim lost 
or judgment suffered as an alleged 
result of the attorney's negligence; and 
it has frequently been held that the 
appears that if the action had been 
properly prosecuted or defended the 
client would have been successful," 
Under the traditional approach, then, there can be 
no finding of liability against an attorney for legal 
malpractice without a finding of plaintiff's "meritorious 
claim" in the underlying action. The failure to find such a 
"meritorious claim" would result in a dismissal of the legal 
malpractice action against the attorney. See for example 
Byrd v. Martin, Hopkins, Lemon and Carter, P.C., supra; 
Garguilo v. Schunk, 395 N.Y.S.2d 751 (A.D.3 Dept. 1977); 
Newman v. Silver, supra; Spannaus v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly, 
and Lindgren, supra; and Blue Water Corp., Inc. v. O'Toole, 
supra. 
Indeed, the only cases holding an attorney liable 
for legal malpractice without such a showing of "meritorious 
claim" are those which follow the contemporary approach 
whereby the burden of proof as to "meritorious claim" is 
shifted to the defendant attorney. See, for example, 
Glidden v. Terranova, supra. Therefore, under either the 
traditional or contemporary approach, the issue of "meritor-
ious claim" is an element of liability in legal malpractice 
actions and any judgment as to liability disposes of the 
issue of "meritorious claim." 
When WILLTAMS moved for summary judgment as to the 
issue of liability, evidence was provided to the Court which 
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established that WILLIAMS' underlying case was defensible. 
(See pages 38, 49 and 50 of the record.) Although BARBER 
now contends that this evidence was not sufficient, BARBER 
chose not to oppose WILLIAMS' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the issue of liability. As a result of BARBER'S failure to 
oppose said Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as his 
failure to appear at the Hearing, the Court granted 
WILLIAMS' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to "all 
issues relating to...liability." Inasmuch as the require-
ment of showing a "meritorious claim" is an element of 
liability in legal malpractice actions, no additional 
evidence as to WILLIAMS' "meritorious claim" was required at 
the trial held to determine the amount of WILLIAMS1 damages. 
See Mendoza v. Schlossman, 448 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1982). 
In light of the foregoing authority, WILLIAMS and 
his attorney in the lower court were justified in under-
standing that following the Court's entry of Summary 
Judgment as to "all issues relating to...1iabi1ity," no 
additional evidence on the issue of "meritorious claim" was 
required at the trial held to determine the amount of 
WILLIAM'S damages. As previously indicated, evidence 
establishing a "meritorious defense" in the underlying 
action was attached to WILLIAM'S Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on the issue of liability and was in the form of 
expert deposition testimony and written correspondence from 
Attorney Martin Becker. (See pages 38, 49 and 50 of the 
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Judgment as to liability and should be foreclosed from now 
arguing that WILLIAMS1 evidence on this issue was inade-
quate. If this Honorable Court should now find that this 
unopposed evidence was inadequate to establish liability on 
Summary Judgment, then this Court should not merely affirm 
tne lower Court's decision but should allow WILLIAMS the 
opportunity to present additional evidence on this issue. 
The lower Court having ruled in favor of WILLIAMS on all 
issues related to liability, WILLIAMS and his attorney were 
justified in proceeding to the trial on damages under the 
understanding that this trial was merely to determine the 
amount of Plaintifffs damages and not to impose yet a second 
requirement of a showing of "meritorious claim." 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing Points and Authorities, 
Appellant WILLIAMS respectfully requests that the judgment 
of the lower Court be reversed as to damages and further 
order included in the damages awarded to WILLIAMS the 
$27,000 default amount entered against WILLIAMS as a result 
of the negligence of Respondent JAMES N. BARBER. WILLIAMS 
further requests that all costs and attorneys1 fees incurred 
by reason of this Appeal be awarded as well. 
J. BRUCE ALVERSON, LTD. 
DALE T. COULAM, ESQ. 
600 S, Eighth Street 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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